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1  Introduction  
Malawi  is  a  small,  densely  populated  country  in 
southern  Africa.    The  population  is  13.1  million, 
according to the preliminary results of the 2008 Census.   
Thus,  the  population  is  slightly  greater  than  that  of 
Zambia  but  less  than  its  other  neighbors.    The 
population13  density  is  110  inhabitants  per  square 
kilometer,  compared  to  an  average  of  34  per km
2 for 
sub-Saharan  Africa.    Malawi  ranks  sixth  in  population 
density among African countries.     
The altitude ranges from 30 meters above sea level in 
the Lower Shire Valley in the south to 3000 m above sea 
level in the mountainous north.  Most of the country, 
however, is above 600 m, giving it a moderate climate in 
spite of the tropical latitude. 
Annual  rainfall  ranges  between  800  and  1400  mm  in 
most areas of Malawi.  The rain is strongly seasonal and 
follows a unimodal pattern, with almost all the annual 
rainfall occurring between November and April.   
Agriculture accounts for about one third (34%) of gross 
domestic product, a higher percentage than in most of 
the  other  countries  in  eastern  and  southern  Africa.  
Maize  is  the  most  important  food  crop,  followed  by 
cassava, sweet potatoes, and sorghum.  The dominant 
export  crop  is  tobacco,  grown  both  by  small-scale 
farmers and on large estates.  Other important cash crops are sugarcane, tea, cotton, and 
coffee, produced mainly by estates.  Agriculture contributes 90% of the export revenue of 
Malawi (World Bank, 2009).  
2  Importance of staple foods in the diet  
Maize is by far the most important food staple in Malawi.  Per capita consumption of maize 
is 133 kg, and it accounts for over half (54%) of the caloric intake of households in Malawi.  
Among the countries of eastern and southern Africa, only Zambia is more dependent on 
maize as a source of calories.  For other countries in the region, maize generally contributes 
20-35%  of the  caloric  intake.    Thus,  it  is  not surprising  that  maize  is  the  focus  of  food 
security policy in Malawi. Cassava and sweet potatoes are also important staple food crops 
in  Malawi.    Cassava  contributes  7%  of  total  caloric  intake,  while  sweet  potatoes  and 
potatoes contribute 8% (see Table 1).  In addition, being more drought-resistant than maize, 
cassava and sweet potatoes become particularly important in low-rainfall years.  
Rice and wheat products together contribute less than 4% of caloric intake, but they are the 
preferred  staples  among  urban  and  high-income  households.    In  contrast,  cassava  is 
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considered a poor man’s crop, and consumption is concentrated in the cassava growing 
regions of the country.  
  






Share of caloric 
intake
(kg/person/year) (kcal/person/day) (percent)
Maize 133 1154 54%
Cassava 89 161 7%




* FAO data combine potato and sweet potato.  
        
3  Production and trade of main staple foods 
This section describes the production and trade patterns of the main staple foods in Malawi: 
maize, cassava, and sweet potatoes.  Production and trade patterns determine whether 
prices are determined by international markets or local supply and demand.   For widely 
traded commodities, the price is largely determined by international prices, trade policy, 
and transportation costs from the port to various markets in the country.  On the other 
hand, for commodities that are not widely traded, prices will depend largely on local supply 
and demand.  Since demand is relatively stable over time, fluctuations in the price of non-
tradables is largely determined by weather-related fluctuations in production.    
3.1  Maize 
As shown in Table 2, Malawi produces about 2.4 million metric tons of maize per year.  The 
actual harvest in a given year varies significantly depending on the weather, but this is the 
average production over 2005-07.  During this time, exports and imports have been quite 
small  relative  to  production.    Imports  averaged  63  thousand  tons,  or  3%  of  apparent 
consumption,  while  exports  were  less  than  6%  of  production.    Thus,  it  is  clear  that  in 
general,  maize  is  a  non-tradable  crop  in  Malawi  so  prices  are  determined  largely  by 
domestic supply and demand.   
 
Table 2.  Production and trade of food staples in Malawi 
Commodity Production Imports Exports




Exports as a 
percentage of 
production
(1000 tonnes) (1000 tonnes) (1000 tonnes) (percent) (percent)
Maize         2,354                63                131  2.8% 5.6%
Cassava         2,756                   0                    0  0.0% 0.0%
Potatoes*         2,218                   0                    0  0.0% 0.0%
Source: FAO, 2009b
Note: The data used are average of 2005,2006 and 2007
             Apparent consumption refers production plus imports minus exports.
          * FAO data for "potatoes" probably refer to sweet potatoes.  Food prices in Malawi   Page 3 
 
However, in years with a poor harvest, 
Malawi  has  imported  maize  from 
northern  Mozambique  and  South 
Africa.    Over  the  past  four  years, 
Malawi  has  had  a  series  of  good 
harvests,  leading  to  a  surplus  for 
export  to  Zimbabwe  and  other 
neighboring  countries.    In  2007, 
Malawi  exported  several  hundred 
thousand  tons  to  Zimbabwe  through 
government-to-government  contracts.  
In  September  2009,  the  government 
announced  it  would  export  40 
thousand tons of maize to Kenya and 
Zimbabwe. 
Nationally, 54% of the small-farm area 
is  planted  with  maize  (NSO-IFPRI, 
2002).  Figure 2 shows the proportions 
in  different  parts  of  the  country.  In 
most  areas,  over  half  the  small-farm 
land is allocated to maize.  More than 75% of the land is planted with maize in a few places, 
including the area north of Nkhata Bay on Lake Malawi and the southern shore of the Lake.  
The white areas of the map correspond to national parks and game reserves.   Overall, 97% 
of Malawi farmers grow maize, the share being over 95% in almost all districts (NSO, 2005).  
The main maize harvest is from April to July, though green maize is harvested in February 
and March.  Thus, the period of greatest food insecurity is December and January.  
3.2  Cassava 
According  to  FAO  statistics,  cassava 
production  in  Malawi  has  grown 
dramatically,  rising  from  about  300 
thousand tons of fresh root in the mid-
1990s to over 3.3 million tons in 2007.  
As  shown  in  Table  2,  cassava 
production over 2005-07 averaged 2.7 
million  tons.    Some  have  questioned 
these  statistics  since  3.3  million  tons 
would imply 250 kg per capita, which 
seems  high  unless  a  large  share  of 
production  is  going  to  feed  and 
industrial use.   
Nationally, 6% of the small-farm area 
is  allocated  to  cassava  production 
(NSO-IFPRI, 2002). Figure 3 shows the 
proportions  in  different  areas  of  the 
country.    Unlike  maize,  cassava   
Figure 3.  Share of small-farm area in cassava 
allocated to cassava 
 
 
Source: NSO-IFPRI, 2002 
Figure 2.  Share of small-farm area in maize  
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production is highly concentrated along the central shore of Lake Malawi in the districts of 
Nkhata Bay.  Here, over 75% of the smallholder area is allocated to cassava production.  
Other  important  cassava  areas  are  along  the  shore  of  Lake  Malawi,  in  the  districts  of 
Nkhotakota (south of Nkhata Bay) and Karonga (north of Nkhata Bay).  In most of the rest of 
the country, cassava accounts for less than 10% of the total area planted by smallholders.   
According to Kambewaa and Nyembe (2008), farmers in the cassava belt grow it mainly for 
home consumption, marketing less than 10% of production. They tend to grow the bitter 
variety.  After harvest, it is washed, peeled, and soaked in water for several days to ferment 
it.  Then it is dried and pounded or milled into flour (kondowole).  Cassava is consumed as a 
staple throughout the year in this area.   
Farmers in the center and south, on the other hand, tend to grow the sweet variety, which 
is produced into dried cassava chips (makaka) without fermentation.  Cassava in these areas 
is more often grown commercially, particularly near the cities.  Cassava consumption here is 
more seasonal than in the cassava belt,  being greatest from November to March when 
maize is less available.  Cassava is also sold fresh for consumption at home and boiled or 
friend for snack food.   Small quantities (1-2%) of cassava are used for starch and other 
industrial purposes (Kambewaa and Nyembe, 2008).  
According to the FAO, Malawi has virtually no trade in cassava with its neighbors (see Table 
2),  but  Kambewaa  and  Nyembe  (2008)  report  that  Mozambique  is  a  source  of  cassava 
supply for Zomba and Blantyre.  
3.3  Sweet potatoes  
Both sweet potatoes and white potatoes are grown in Malawi, but sweet potatoes are much 
more important.  According to NSO-IFPRI (2002), sweet potatoes occupy about 5% of the 
area cultivated by small-scale farmers.  
Figures  for  white  potatoes  are  not 
given,  the  area  being  included  in  the 
2%  for  “other  crops.”    As  shown  in 
Figure  4,  sweet  potatoes  are  grown 
throughout  the  country,  though  the 
share  of  the  small-farmer  area 
allocated to this crop is generally less 
than  25%.    Centers  of  sweet  potato 
production  are  in  the  south,  near 
Zomba, and in the extreme north.  
According to FAO-WFP (2005), 46% of 
sweet  potato  production  comes  from 
two  of  the  eight  Agricultural 
Development Divisions (ADD), Blantyre 
and Machinga, both in the south.   In 
contrast,  almost  two  thirds  of  white 
potato production comes the Lilongwe 
ADD,  mostly  the  highland  Dedze 
district.   
 
Source: NSO-IFPRI, 2002.  
Figure 4.  Share of small-farm area in sweet potatoes Food prices in Malawi   Page 5 
 
According to FAO-WFP (2005), sweet potato production grew from 200 thousand tons in 
1993/4 to 1.7 million tons in 2003/4, while white potato production remained below 500 
thousand tons in 2003/4.  
FAO production statistics appear to combine sweet potato and white potato production 
under the category “potato” (FAO, 2009b).  According to this source, production was around 
60 thousand tons in the 1960s and grew slowly until the 1990s.  Since the mid-1990s, it 
expanded rapidly, rising from about 400 thousand tons to almost 2.9 million tons in 2007.  
Malawi is now the largest producer in sub-Saharan Africa.   
Sweet potatoes are generally planted with maize and beans during the main planting season 
between October and March.   In some areas, a second crop can be planted in July using 
residual moisture for harvest in September.  
4  Staple food price patterns 
In this section, we examine the patterns and trends staple food prices in Malawi.  The focus 
is on maize but some information on cassava prices is also provided.   
4.1  Maize prices 
As mentioned above, maize is the dominant food staple in Malawi, being cultivated by 97% 
of  the  farmers,  occupying  54%  of  the  land  cultivated  by  small-scale  farmers,  and 
contributing 54% of the caloric intake on average (NSO, 2005; NSO-IFPRI, 2002; and FAO, 
2009a).  We examine monthly wholesale price data from eight markets over 1994-2008.  
Below is a brief description of the eight markets: 
  Chitipa is in the extreme northern corner of Malawi.  It is located in a mountainous area 
at 1250 m.  It is near the borders with Zambia and Tanzania, facilitating occasional maize 
imports from southern Tanzania.   
  Karonga is also in the far north, about 80 km southeast of Chitipa, on Lake Malawi (see 
Figure  1).    The  area  is  part  of  the  cassava  belt,  though  maize  production  is  also 
widespread there.  
  Rumphi is located south of Karonga and inland.  It is located near two national parks and 
tobacco growing areas.   
  Mzuzu is the third largest city in Malawi and the capital of the Northern Region.  It is 
located inland, southeast of Rumphi (see Figure 1) 
  Nkhata Bay is on Lake Malawi, southeast of Mzuzu (see Figure 1).  This is the center of 
the cassava belt where more than 75% of the farmers grow cassava.   
  Lilongwe is the capital and largest city in Malawi, with a population of about 800,000. It 
is located south of Nkhata Bay in the Central Region (see Figure 1).     
  Mitundu is a market town on the outskirts of Lilongwe, in central Malawi.     
  Lunzu is on the outskirts of Blantyre, the second largest city, located in southern Malawi 
(see Figure 1).   
Figure 5 shows maize price trends for eight markets in Malawi over the period 1994-2008, 
converted to US dollars, along with US yellow maize price and the South African white maize 
price.  Several patterns can be identified from this graph:   Food prices in Malawi   Page 6 
 
  Maize prices in Malawi are generally higher than those in US and South African.  For 
some  markets  in  some  months,  the  Malawi  prices  are  four  times  higher  than  the 
international price. 
  Maize prices in Malawi are much more volatile than international prices.  In fact, they 
are more volatile than the maize prices in many other African countries.  Chapoto and 
Jayne (2009) calculate the coefficient of variation for the capital cities of eight countries 
in eastern and southern Africa and find that Malawi has the largest volatility among 
them.   
  Most of the maize prices in Malawi follow a common pattern with some variations.  For  
example, the spikes in January 1998, February 2002, February 2006, and March 2008 
occur in most or all of the eight markets in Malawi. 
  A seasonal pattern can be discerned, given that the peaks tend to occur in January, 
February, and March.   
 

























































































































































































































The main price spikes occurred in the early months of 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2008.  The first 
three spikes are understandable in light of the maize production data presented in Table 3.  
Relative to the previous year, maize production fell 25% in 1997, 32% in 2001, and 24% in 
2005.  When the harvest is below average in a given year, the price spikes tend to occur 
early in the following year when stocks are depleted before the next harvest.  In addition, 
each of these price spikes corresponds to a year with imports of more than 200 thousand 
tons, either in the planting year or the harvest year.  
It is somewhat surprising that the largest drop in maize production occurred in 1994, yet 
prices in early 1995 were normal or even below average.  One possible explanation is that 
1994  also  had  the  largest  maize  imports  (389  thousand  tons)  in  the  period  under 
consideration.  Another anomaly is that the 2007 harvest was above average, yet prices rose Food prices in Malawi   Page 7 
 
dramatically in late 2007 and early 2008, corresponding to the global food crisis.  This period 
is discussed further below.  
 
Table 3. Maize production and trade in Malawi 
Year Production Percent Imports Exports
(1000 tons) change (1000 tons) (1000 tons)
1994 1,040 -49% 389 1
1995 1,661 60% 235 3
1996 1,793 8% 83 0
1997 1,352 -25% 54 1
1998 1,772 31% 319 0
1999 2,479 40% 28 0
2000 2,501 1% 8 11
2001 1,713 -32% 9 10
2002 1,557 -9% 348 2
2003 1,983 27% 62 55
2004 1,608 -19% 54 13
2005 1,225 -24% 113 0
2006 2,611 113% 56 1
2007 3,226 24% 20 391  
Source: FAO, 2009b. 
 
Figure 6 shows the average price for each month of the year, allowing us to more easily 
identify the seasonal pattern and the average level of prices in each market.  The lowest 
maize prices are in Mitundu (outside of Lilongwe), Lilongwe, and Chitipa (in the extreme 
north).  The prices in Lilongwe and Mitundu are low because these markets are located in an 
important maize-growing region of the country (see Figure 2).  Chitipa is a highland region 
not known as a surplus maize zone.  The low maize prices in Chitipa may be related to the 
inflow of maize from the southern highlands of Tanzania.  On average, the maize prices in 
Songea  (southern  Tanzania)  are  among  the  lowest  in  eastern  and  southern  Africa  (see 
Minot, 2009).  
The highest maize prices are in Lunzu and Nkhata Bay.  Lunzu is on the outskirts of Blantyre, 
the second-largest city in Malawi, in the Southern Region. Although almost all farmers grow 
maize in this region, the population density in southern Malawi is higher than in the north, 
so the average farm size is even smaller than the national average.  Since southern Malawi is 
considered the food deficit region, it is not surprising that maize prices are high.  Nkhata 
Bay, in the north on the Lake, is the center of the cassava belt. Over 90% of the farmers in 
this  district  grow  cassava.    Although  66%  of  the  farmers  grow  maize,  this  is  lowest 
percentage of all 30 districts in Malawi.  For this reason, it seems likely that Nkhata Bay is a 
maize deficit district, drawing maize from surplus zones with high prices. 
With the exception of Lunzu and Nkhata Bay, maize prices in the other six markets tend to 
remain within US$ 30-40 per ton of each other.   Assuming a transfer cost of US$ 0.10 per 
km-ton, this would cover the cost of moving a ton of maize 300-400 km. 
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Figure 7 shows the seasonality index, calculated as the average price for the month divided 
by the average overall price.  Maize prices fall sharply in April as the rains end and green 
maize comes on the market.  They reach the lowest level in June and July when the main 
maize harvest comes to market.   After the harvest, they rise slowly throughout the second 
half of the year, reflecting the cost of storage.  
However, the seasonal patterns vary somewhat by region.  Maize prices fall earlier in Lunzu, 
Mitundu, and Lilongwe than they do in the northern markets.  Prices in these three markets 
bottom out in May, while prices in the northern markets reach their minimums in June and 
July.  This reflects the different cropping calendar with earlier harvests in the center and 
south.   
A simple measure of seasonality is the ratio of the highest monthly price to the lowest.  
Across  the  eight  markets,  the  average  ratio  is  1.78,  but  there  are  important  regional 
differences.    The  ratio  is  less  than  1.55  in  the  cassava-growing  zones  of  Karonga  and 
Rumphi, but above 2.00 in the Mitundu (near Lilongwe) and Lunzu (near Blantyre).  This may 
be due to the fact that cassava is more available in the north than in the center and south; 
where consumers have an alternative, they are less likely to bid up the price of maize.  
Alternatively, cassava availability may be the same, but consumers may be more flexible in 
their food choices.  With cassava as part of their regular diet, northern consumers may more 
easily switch when maize prices rise a little, while southern consumers resist, bidding up the 
maize price.  In economic terms, consumers in the south may be more price-inelastic in their 
maize demand. Food prices in Malawi   Page 9 
 
 























































4.2  Cassava price 
Kambewaa  and  Nyembe  (2008)  provide  some  information  on  cassava  price  patterns.  
Cassava  prices  are  lowest  in  Kasungu  (Central  Region)  and  Mzuzu  (Northern  Region), 
intermediate in Lilongwe (Central Region), and  higherest in Zomba and Blantyre (both in the 
Southern Region).  This is not surprising given than cassava production is concentrated in 
the Northern Region.  The range of prices is quite extreme, however: during November 
2007, the harvest-season cassava price ranged from 4 Malawi Kwacha (MK) per kg in Mzuzu 
to 16 MK/kg in Zomba, equivalent to a range of US$ 30 to US$ 118 per ton.  The large spatial 
variation in price reflects both the cost of transporting a commodity like cassava with a low 
value-bulk ratio and the fact that fresh cassava is highly perishable.   
Cassava prices also follow a seasonal pattern.  Much of the cassava harvest comes to market 
between November and March, when maize supply is low.  During this period, cassava 
prices are low because supplies are plentiful and it is being sourced locally.  From April to 
October, cassava is harder to find and the prices are 30-90% higher. 
In November 2007, the price of cassava flour ranged from about 30 MK/kg (US$ 222/ton) in 
Mzuzu to double that price in Zomba and Blantyre.  In contrast, white maize flour produced 
by large-scale mills cost somewhat more (52-94 MK/kg) and wheat flour was considerably 
more (104 MK/kg) (Kambewaa and Nyembe, 2008).   
4.3  Spatial market integration 
Several studies have examined the spatial integration of food markets in Malawi, that is, the 
degree to which the prices in different food markets move together.  Goletti and Babu 
(1994)  examine  the  behavior  of  maize  prices  in  Malawi  before  and  after  market 
liberalizations using cointegration analysis.  They use monthly retail data for eight markets 
over  the  period  1984-1991,  testing  the  cointegration  of  each  market  pair.    Before Food prices in Malawi   Page 10 
 
liberalization, 18 of the 48 market pairs were cointegrated, but after market liberalization 34 
pairs were cointegrated.  This indicates that the market liberalization in 1987 improved the 
transmission of price changes from one market to another.  On the other hand, they find 
that the transmission is only partial and can be slow.  The average adjustment to an initial 
shock  took  5.7  months.    Finally,  the  study  examines  the  symmetry  of  adjustment.  
Asymmetric price adjustment, in which traders pass on advantageous price changes more 
quickly than disadvantageous one, is one sign of imperfect competition.  They find little 
evidence  that  increases  in maize  prices  are  transmitted  any faster or slower  than  price 
decreases.   
Chirwa (2000, cited in Meyers, 2008) uses cointegration methods to examine maize and rice 
prices in Malawi. He tests whether markets are cointegrated in the sense of following a 
common pattern.  He finds several of the main markets are cointegrated.  
Chirwa and Zakeyo (2006) report on their analysis comparing market integration before and 
after liberalization in the mid-1990s.  They find that integration has improved and the main 
markets are well integrated, but for more remote markets in the country, the evidence is 
mixed.  They also find that the markets for fully liberalized commodities (bean, rice, and 
groundnuts) are more integrated than the markets for maize, possibly reflecting continued 
government intervention in maize marketing and trade.  
Meyers (2008) analyzes spatial market integration in Malawi using weekly maize prices from 
ten markets over the period 2001-2008. He focuses on nine pairs of markets.  The price 
spreads are quite volatile and often turn negative, suggesting that the trade flows are not 
continuous and that there may even be trade reversals.   The study finds strong evidence of 
a long-run relationship in six of the nine market pairs tested.  Half of the full adjustment 
back  to  the  long-run  equilibrium  occurs  within  1-2  weeks  for  all  market  pairs.    This 
adjustment is more rapid than estimated by earlier studies of Malawi maize markets by 
Goletti and Babu (1994) and Chirwa (2000), suggesting an improvement in market efficiency 
over time.  It is also comparable to the speed of adjustment of maize and soybean markets 
in the United States, estimated to range between 0.2 and 3 weeks (Goodwin and Piggot, 
2001).   
Meyers (2008) estimated the threshold above which price transmission occurs ranged from 
0.5 Malawi kwacha/kg to 6.4 MK/kg across the nine market pairs studied. For most of the 
pairs, the threshold estimates appear to correspond with estimates of the marketing cost, 
but  for  two  pairs,  the  threshold  seem  to  large  given  the  short  distance  between  the 
markets. 
5  Food price policy 
Given the importance of maize in Malawi, it is not surprising that food policy focuses largely 
on this commodity.  Food security is largely defined as access to maize, and maize self-
sufficiency is seen as the best strategy for improving access.  Some of the main elements of 
this policy are intervention in food markets by the parastatal Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), restrictions on maize trade, and a large fertilizer subsidy 
program.  Food prices in Malawi   Page 11 
 
5.1  Evolution of food policy in Malawi 
The  Agricultural  and  Livestock  Marketing  Act  of  1964  regulated  agricultural  marketing 
through various state enterprises.  In 1971, these enterprises were merged to form the 
Agricultural  Development  and  Marketing  Corporation  (ADMARC),  with  responsibility  for 
purchasing,  processing,  and  marketing  agricultural  products;  stabilizing  food  prices;  and 
maintaining  food  security  reserves.    Through  ADMARC,  the  government  maintain  pan-
territorial and pan-seasonal prices for maize and other food crops grown by smallholders.  
Although there was criticism that the system taxed smallholders and favored the export-
oriented estate sector, Malawi was generally food self-sufficient and enjoyed healthy rates 
of economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s.   
However, the oil crisis of 1979 and the interruption of trade by the war in Mozambique 
caused a severe economic crisis in Malawi.  The government was forced to turn to the 
World  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  for  financial  support,  which  entailed 
agreeing  to  policy  conditions  (Chirwa,  2006).      Under  a  series  of  structural  adjustment 
programs in the 1980s, Malawi carried out reforms to liberalize the economy:    
  Over  1982-96,  the  price  bands  at  which  ADMARC  would  buy  and  sell  were  revised 
annually and moved closer to parity with international prices. 
  In 1987, the monopsony power of ADMARC over small-holder food crops was eliminated 
and private trade was legalized, subject to licensing.  The prices of most crops were 
liberalized, leaving ADMARC in the role of buyer of last resort (Smith, 1995). 
  In 1995, the government liberalized the marketing of cash crops.  As a result, 20% of 
smallholders now grow burley tobacco, producing about 70% of the national output 
(NSO-IFPRI, 2002).  Prices of all crops except maize were liberalized. 
  In  1997,  the  licensing  requirement  for  agricultural  traders  was  eliminated,  with  the 
exception of those trading in maize. 
  In 1999, the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) was created to manage emergency 
food stocks, in theory allowing ADMARC to focus on commercial activities. 
  In 2000, ADMARC abandoned the maize price band.  With competitive pressure from 
private traders, it was difficult for ADMARC to defend the maize price floor and ceiling.   
Under increasing competition from private traders, the role of ADMARC has diminished 
markedly.    As  shown  in  Table  4,  AMARC’s  purchases  ranged  from  38  thousand  to  239 
thousand tons per year, including 13-198 thousand tons of maize.  Between 2000 and 2007, 
however, the annual volume was 3-83 thousand tons, including less than 10 thousand tons 
of maize.  These figures, however, do not include quantities purchased by the NRFA to 
maintain a strategic reserve.  Recent evolution of food policy, including the operations of 
the NRFA, are discussed below in sections 5.6 to 5.8.  
While the role of ADMARC declined markedly, there is strong political and social pressure to 
maintain their operations, particularly in remote locations.  Jayne et al (2008a) describes the 
ambivalent feeling of farmers toward ADMARC.  On the one hand, they often do not trust 
ADMARC agents to fairly weigh their maize, and they complain about low prices paid to 
farmers, late payments, and limited buying schedule.  On the other hand, they see ADMARC 
as keeping the maize in the region, making it available for purchase during the lean season.   Food prices in Malawi   Page 12 
 
 
Table 4.  Quantity of crop purchases by ADMARC 
  
Total 
Purchases  Tobacco  Maize  Pulses  Rice  Cotton  Groundnut  Other 
     
(metric  tons) 
      1992              78,078   14,596  40,427  8,781  555  13,071  648  0 
1993              48,859   6,392  ..  5,629  13,547  22,008  1,283  0 
1994              37,659   5,573  21,778  3,792  837  2,462  3,217  0 
1995            131,260   10,279  87,228  10,638  8,612  12,155  2,348  0 
1996            168,660   8,793  96,489  18,054  8,387  35,010  1,927  0 
1997              56,518   9,142  12,586  3,839  6,317  15,451  9,183  0 
1998            112,771   18,936  57,896  8,807  15,399  7,254  4,479  0 
1999            238,607   9,226  198,021  10,792  11,175  7,619  1,774  0 
2000              20,125   9,901  0  2,695  8  6,894  619  8 
2001              20,230   2,890  2,890  2,890  2,890  2,890  2,890  2,890 
2002                5,792   0  0  0  1,125  4,467  200  0 
2003  3,158  0  0  0  2,796  0  362  0 
2004  10,183  0  7,000  115  2,657  0  411  0 
2005  9,765  0  9,097  0  668  0  0  0 
2006  83,801  0  75,622  0  8,134  0  44  1 
2007  29,487  ..  25,542  803  ..  0  3,038  104 
Source: NSO, 2008. 
 
5.1  Trade policy 
As part of the structural adjustment programs, export licensing requirements have been 
phased  out  for  all  food  commodities  except  for  maize  and  cassava.    The  government 
regularly  bans  the  export  of  maize  when  the  domestic  price  is  high  or  there  is  some 
uncertainty regarding the size of the next harvest.  As a result, most exports are carried out 
either by the government as part of government-to-government sales or in the form of 
cross-border trade.  
Import licenses are also required to import maize.   When there is a food shortage, the 
government  usually  arranges  maize  imports.    Bans  on  maize  imports  are  rare,  but  the 
uncertainty  concerning  government  imports  makes  private  traders  reluctant  to  import 
maize (Rubey, 2003; Chirwa, 2007).   However, when the local harvest is poor, there can be 
significant  cross-border  trade,  particularly  from  northern  Mozambique  and,  to  a  lesser 
degree, from southern Tanzania.  One study estimated that during crisis years, 150 to 250 
thousand tons are imported from northern Mozambique (FAO-WFP, 2005).  According to 
FAO statistics, maize imports were over 300 thousand tons during four years over the period 
1994-2007. 
5.2  Public food stocks 
Between 1987 and 1999, ADMARC managed a strategic grain reserve that held a maximum 
of 80 thousand tons each year.  As mentioned above, the Malawi National Food Reserve 
Agency (NFRA) was created in 1999 to take responsibility for maintaining emergency food 
stocks. The target of the NFRA is to maintain 30-60 thousand tons of grain to cover localized 
emergencies until imported grain can be delivered.  The stocks are generally  between 20 
and 60 thousand tons but occasionally they are much higher.  In 2000, for example, the 
NFRA held 165 thousand tons.  Although the NFRA is intended primarily to serve emergency 
needs  while  imports  are  arranged,  the  government  has  used  the  NFRA  to  attempt  to 
stabilize prices (Chirwa, 2006; IMF, 2002).   Food prices in Malawi   Page 13 
 
5.3  Price controls 
Until 2000, ADMARC attempted to set maize price band, an upper and lower limit that it 
would  defend  by  selling  or  buying  maize,  respectively.    The  impact  of  these  policies  is 
debated.  Some argue that the quantities  were too small to affect market prices, while 
others argue that ADMARC provided access to maize for rural households in remote areas 
not well served by markets (Jayne et al, 2008a).  Since then, ADMARC has abandoned the 
maize price band and has been given a more commercial role.  However, because of the 
politically sensitive nature of maize prices, ADMARC continues to be used as a mechanism 
for the government to influence maize prices.   
In August 2008, the government responded to high food prices by banning private trade, 
followed by “clarification” that private trade was legal provided that traders respected the 
buying-price ceiling of 52 Malawi kwacha (MK) per kilogram.   
5.4  Fertilizer policy 
Fertilizer policy in Malawi has involved a series of different types of subsidy programs, with 
occasionally periods of liberalization.  Malawi eliminated fertilizer subsidies in the 1980s, 
then reintroduced them in 1987.  Subsidies were again phased out in the mid-1990s, but 
reintroduced  in  1998  in  the  form  of  the  Starter  Pack  program.    This  program  gave  all 
farmers, free of charge, 10–15 kg of fertilizer and small quantities of improved seed. After 
two  years,  this  program  was  converted  into  the  Targeted  Input  Program  (TIP),  which 
distributed the packs to a targeted group of farmers, with the percentage of all farming 
households in Malawi targeted varying between 33 and 96 percent, depending on the year 
(Levy, 2005).   
In 2005, the program was redesigned as the Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Program (AISP), a 
voucher-based universal subsidy program that allows farmers to buy 100 kg of fertilizer at 
about  one-fifth  of  the  market  price,  thus  dramatically  increasing  both  the  quantity  of 
fertilizer being subsidized and the fiscal cost of the subsidy (US$ 200 million in 2007-08). The 
expanded input subsidy program is credited with helping Malawi become self-sufficient in 
maize and has inspired similar programs elsewhere in Africa.  However, it has done so by 
largely displacing the private distribution network. Although the government experimented 
with allowing fertilizer vouchers to be redeemed at private distributors, this effort has been 
discontinued  and  almost  all  subsidized  inputs  are  now  distributed  through  ADMARC 
(Dorward and Chirwa, 2008). 
5.5  Experience with the 2001-02 food crisis 
The rains in 1998-99 were good, leading to a bumper harvest in 1999.  The newly formed 
National Food Reserve Agency built up its stocks to 167 thousand tons, double the usual 
level.  The IMF and the World Bank viewed this as excessive for a strategic reserve stock.  A 
government-commissioned report in 2000 recommended stocks of 30-60 thousand tons.  
ADMARC (which managed the stock for NFRA) sold almost all the stock in the second half of 
2000, depressing maize prices.  With lower incentives and poor rains, the 2001 harvest was 
32% below the previous year, making it difficult to replenish the stock (see Table 3).  The 
2001-02 rains were also uneven, indicating a serious shortfall.  In late 2001, the government 
ordered 150 thousand tons of imports, but logistical problems delayed its arrival.  In early 
2002,  the  price  of  maize  reached  the  equivalent  of  US$  500  per  ton  in  Lilongwe  and Food prices in Malawi   Page 14 
 
Blantyre, and the government declared a food emergency.  Eventually, food imports and the 
2002 harvest brought prices down, but the experience created political aftershocks. 
A widespread view in Malawi is that crisis was caused by depletion of the strategic reserve, 
as a result of pressure from the IMF and the World Bank (Chirwa, 2007).  The IMF attributes 
the  crisis  to  1)  the  sale  of  the  stock  before  the  2001  harvest  assessments  had  been 
completed, 2) the sale of the entire stock rather than reducing it to the recommended level, 
and 3) the lack of good information on size of the shortfall.  They also note that the sale of 
the stock was not authorized by the government, leading to a corruption investigation (IMF, 
2002).  Rubey (2003; 2005) notes that even 167 thousand tons would not have filled the 
maize deficit in early 2002.  He points to the policy environment that inhibited private sector 
response:  
Much of the price volatility in late 2001 and early 2002 was due to lack of private sector 
action  in  bringing  in  supplies  from  outside  the  country  when  prices  went  up.  The 
private  sector  was  unwilling  to  act  because  of  the  uncertainty  about  government 
intervention in the market as well as subsidized consumer maize prices that eliminated 
any profit incentive to import (Rubey, 2003).   
ADMARC sold maize imported from South Africa at below-market prices, discouraging any 
private imports.  When traders realized that ADMARC would run out before the harvest, 
they began to arrange imports, but it was too late to avoid a shortage and severe price spike 
in early 2002 (Rubey, 2005; Jayne et al, 2005).   
5.6  Experience with the 2005-06 food crisis 
Malawi experienced another price spike in late 2005 and early 2006.  In large part, this was 
caused by poor rains in the 2004-2005 growing season.  In addition, it was expected that the 
new  government  would  implement  an  expanded  fertilizer  subsidy  program,  so  many 
farmers waited to purchase fertilizer.  Private fertilizer dealers were reluctant to import 
given  the  expectation  of  a  large  subsidy  program.    The  implementation  of  the  subsidy 
program was delayed by debate with the government and reduced in size due to funding 
constraints.  By the end of October, barely one third of the fertilizer needed for planting was 
available (FAO-WFP, 2005; Rubey, 2005).  This contributed to the 24% decline in the 2005 
maize harvest, below an already low 2004 harvest.  It is interesting to note that, although 
the 2005 harvest (1.2 million tons) was much smaller than in 2002 harvest (1.7 million tons), 
the price spike in early 2006 was much less severe than in early 2002.  This suggests that the 
appropriate policy environment can ameliorate the impact of supply shocks on food prices.  
5.7  Experience with the 2007-08 food crisis 
The combination of good rains in the 2006-07 agricultural year and the newly expanded 
fertilizer subsidy program led to a bumper crop in 2007, estimated at 3.4 million tons of 
maize.  The government issued tenders to traders to assemble 450 thousand tons for export 
to Zimbabwe.  By late 2007, the government had exported 283 thousand tons.  However, in 
the process, the price of maize was bid up 65% over the second half of the year, causing the 
government to suspend the procurement program.  In fact, prices in Malawi rose above 
those  in  neighboring  countries,  resulting  in  an  inflow  of  maize  from  Mozambique  and 
Tanzania through cross-border trade (Jayne et al, 2008b).  
In 2008, the government reported another bumper harvest, with an estimated surplus even 
larger than in 2007.  As ADMARC began its procurement program, it was forced to raise the Food prices in Malawi   Page 15 
 
buying price numerous times in order to compete with traders.  By August, ADMARC and 
NFRA were only able to purchase 60 thousand tons, and the maize price in Lilongwe had 
risen to close to US$ 400 per ton.  Reflecting the widespread view that the high prices were 
the result of hoarding by traders, the government banned private trade in maize in August 
2008, effectively restoring the legal monopoly of ADMARC on maize trading.  Later, the ban 
was partly relaxed to allow small-scale trade, provided the price ceiling  of 52 MK/kg is 
respected  (Jayne et al., 2008b; FAO, 2009d; ANN, 2008).  The ceiling does not seem to be 
enforced, given that the retail price of maize rose above 70 MK/kg in early 2009.  
Jayne  et  al.  (2008b)  argue  that  official  crop  production  estimates  for  2007  may  be 
overestimated.  They note that high prices, maize imports, and rationing by ADMARC “are 
difficult to reconcile with the official estimates of a record maize harvest of 3.4 million tons 
in 2007.”  
The 2009 maize harvest was estimated at 3.6 million tons.  In response, the government has 
lifted the ban on private maize exports.  In addition, maize prices are declining, so that the 
52 MK/kg ceiling is no longer binding, though prices remain above the pre-crisis average 
(FEWS-NET, 2009).   
6  Summary and conclusions 
The agricultural economy of Malawi has four characteristics that make managing food prices 
particularly  difficult.    First,  the  diet  is  heavily  dependent  on  maize,  this  commodity 
accounting for over half of the caloric intake.  This means that food security is closely tied to 
the harvest of one crop.  Second, Malawi is landlocked, so imports and exports face high 
costs of transport.  This creates a wide band between import and export parity prices within 
which  domestic  prices  can  fluctuate,  although  cross-border  trade  with  Tanzania  and 
Mozambique lowers the effective import parity price to some degree.  Third, the unimodal 
rainfall pattern means that the seasonal fluctuation in prices is greater than in some other 
countries in the region such as Kenya and Uganda.  And fourth, the high population density, 
small farms, and low level of income of farmers, even by African standards, mean that many 
rural households are one bad harvest away from hunger and deprivation.  As a result, maize 
price volatility is higher in Malawi than elsewhere in the region, and the volatility has serious 
implications for food security.  
Studies of market integration in Malawi suggest that 1) market liberalization has improved 
the degree of integration between major towns in the country, 2) the major towns are 
integrated with each other with relatively rapid adjustment, suggesting functioning markets, 
and 3) smaller and more remote town remain disconnected from national markets.   
The  evolution  of  food  policy  in  Malawi  reveals  a  somewhat  erratic  process  of  market 
liberalization.  ADMARC lost its monopoly over grain trade in 1989 and it role in enforcing a 
price band in 2000, but the monopoly was temporarily restored in response to the food 
crisis of 2007-08.  Similarly, food price controls were eliminated in the 1980s but reinstated 
in 2008 (though not fully enforced).  Fertilizer policy has also experience numerous changes 
and reversals.   
The fertilizer subsidy program has been credited with four consecutive bumper harvests in 
maize  (2006-09).  Critics  point  out  that  it  has  largely  displaced  the  private  distribution 
network, that the costs may be unsustainable, and that the 2007 harvest was probably Food prices in Malawi   Page 16 
 
overestimated, but it is popular in the country and is being adopted by a number of other 
African countries.  
On the other hand, the parallel commercial operations of traders and the government have 
created problems.  In 2001, the sale of subsidized maize and the plans for public-sector 
maize imports inhibited private imports, creating a serious shortage when ADMARC stocked 
out and government imports were delayed.  In 2004, fertilizer imports were stalled by a 
when government plans to launch the new subsidy program were delayed and scaled back.  
Experience suggests that private traders can play a useful role in importing maize during 
shortages, thus putting a ceiling on maize prices, but only if they can be reassured they will 
not be competing with subsidized government imports.  One the main challenges facing 
policymakers  in  Malawi  is  to  design  a framework  for  public  sector  intervention  in  food 
markets  which  is  flexible  enough  to  allow  it  to  respond  to  emergencies,  yet  limited, 
transparent,  and  predictable  enough  to  provide  the  private  sector  with  a  business 
environment that will favor trade, storage, and marketing investment.   
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